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California Code of Civil Procedure
Section 351: Who's Really Paying the
Toll?
California Code of Civil Procedure section 3511 tolls a statute
of limitations where either a defendant is not within the state when
the cause of action accrues, or where a defendant leaves the state
after the cause of action accrues.2 California courts, in interpreting
section 351, have created an inconsistent body of law The
inconsistencies arise where the defendant is already amenable to
alternative service of process4 or where the defendant has never
been physically present in California.5
Although these situations involve a broad application of section
351, the general trend has been to limit the scope of section 351.6
For example, courts have found that section 351 does not apply to
1. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 351 (West Supp. 1992). Section 351 states:
If, when the cause of action accrues against a person, he is out of the State, the action
may be commenced within the term herein limited, after his return to the State, and if,
after the cause of action accrues, he departs from the State, the time of his absence is not
part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.
Id
2. Id See BLAcK's LAw DICzroNARY 1488 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "toll" as "to suspend
or stop temporarily"). See also id. at 21 (explaining that a cause of action accrues when a suit may
be maintained thereon).
3. See infra notes 186-214 and accompanying text (discussing the inconsistencies inherent
in the application of section 351).
4. See infra notes 69-87 and accompanying text (discussing the applicability of section 351
despite the fact that alternative service may have been available).
5. See infra notes 111-128 and accompanying text (discussing the tolling provision's
applications in situations where the defendant has never been physically present in the state).
6. See Abramson v. Brownstein, 897 F.2d 389, 393 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding section 351
unconstitutional in situations involving interstate commerce); Cardoso v. American Medical Systems,
Inc., 183 Cal. App. 3d 994, 998-99,228 Cal. Rptr. 627, 628-29 (1986) (stating that the section 351
tolling statute does not apply to foreign corporations); Epstein v. Frank, 125 Cal. App. 3d 111, 120,
177 Cal. Rptr. 831, 835 (1981) (holding section 351 inapplicable to limited partnerships when the
sole general partner is absent from the state); Bigelow v. Smik, 6 Cal. App. 3d 10, 15, 85 Cal. Rptr.
613, 616 (1970) (holding that the tolling statute does not apply to nonresident motorists).
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cases involving defendant corporations7  and nonresident
motorists In addition, the statute's scope of application has been
limited by Abramson v. Brownstein.9 In Abramson, the United
States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the use of section
351 in cases involving interstate commerce is an unconstitutional
violation of the Commerce Clause."0 The narrowed scope of
section 351 illustrated by cases like Abramson is indicative of both
the federal and California courts' recognition that the need for
section 351 no longer outweighs the burden it places on defendants.
The California Legislature originally enacted section 351 to
alleviate the adverse effect on resident plaintiffs created by the
state courts' inability to assert in personam jurisdiction over out-of-
state defendants.11 However, this purpose is now adequately
served by state long arm statutes and alternative service of
process.1 2 Long arm statutes13 and alternative methods of serving
7. See Loope v. Greyhound, Inc., 114 Cal. App. 2d 611,614,250 P.2d 651,653 (1952). See
also infra notes 129-136 and accompanying text (discussing the inapplicability of section 351 to
corporate defendants).
8. See Bigelow v. Smik, 6 Cal. App. 3d 10, 15, 85 Cal. Rptr. 613, 616 (1970) (holding that
section 351 does not apply to nonresident motorists). See infra note 97-108 and accompanying text
(discussing the inapplicability of section 351 to nonresident motorists).
9. 897 F.2d 389 (1990). See infra note 171-179 and accompanying text (discussing the
Court's reasoning in Abramson).
10. Abramson v. Brownstein, 897 F.2d 389,393 (9th Cir. 1990). See infra notes 171-179 and
accompanying text (discussing the holding in Abramson v. Brownstein).
11. See Dew v. Appleberry, 23 Cal. 3d 630, 633-34, 591 P.2d 509,511, 153 Cal. Rptr. 219,
221 (1979) (noting that the original purpose of section 351 was to protect resident plaintiffs from out
of state defendants who could not be served with a summons and complaint in an in personam
action). The court in Dew noted that despite the fact that the original purpose served by section 351
has been eliminated by subsequent law, the legislature may have reasonably determined that because
it is more difficult to serve a defendant who is not physically present in the state, it would not be fair
to force a resident plaintiff to pursue a defendant out of the state. l at 634-35, 591 P.2d at 512, 153
Cal. Rptr. at 221.
12. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S 310, 316 (1945) (holding that a state
court could subject a person outside the territorial limits of its borders to service of process if there
was specified minimum contacts with the state such that traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice were served). See also infra notes 43-56 and accompanying text (discussing
development of long arm statutes).
13. See J. FRiEDENTHAL, M. KANE6 A. MHLuR, CrvIL PRocEutn 139-40 (West Publishing
Co. 1985). Long arm statutes assert jurisdiction over nonresidents based on whatever contacts the
nonresident has with the forum, including the transaction of business in the state and the commission
of any one of a number of acts usually set forth in the statute. Id Some examples of acts referred
to under the long arm statutes to determine if sufficient contacts exist with the forum state are the
commission of a tort within the state or outside of the state but impacting people or property within
1640
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process 4 render section 351 an unnecessary burden on defendants
who are outside of the state while the statute of limitations runs."1
In addition, plaintiffs have increasingly utilized section 351 in a
manner inconsistent with its original purpose. 16 For these reasons,
section 351 should be repealed, or in the alternative, amended to
avoid the problems resulting from its current application. 7
This Comment will discuss the problems created in the current
application of section 351, and examine whether the California
Legislature should repeal section 351 or amend it to avoid these
problems. Part I provides the legal background of tolling statutes
relating to out of state defendants. 18 Part II analyzes the case law
and legislative development of section 351."9 Part In1 focuses on
the inequities inherent in various applications of section 351, and
the affect of such applications on parties to the action. ° Finally,
Part IV suggests that the legislature should repeal section 351, and
proposes a statutory alternative.2 1
the state, ownership of property within the state, or the entry into a contract with residents of the
state. Id.
14. See id at 164. The authors note that due process demands that defendant be given notice
of the institution of proceedings against him or her, and then define process as the means by which
a defendant is given notice and an opportunity to be heard. d Process generally consists of a
summons, which directs the defendant to appear before the court under penalty of default, and a copy
of the complaint. Id. at 165.
15. See infra notes 51-56, 188-196 and accompanying text (discussing how. the necessity of
section 351 is decreased by subsequently enacted legislation and case law). See also infra notes 111-
128, 197-199 and accompanying text (discussing the burden section 351 imposes on defendant by
forcing them to be physically present in the state in order to be benefitted by a statute of limitations
defense).
16. See O'Laskey v. Sortino, 224 Cal. App. 3d 241, 252, 273 Cal. Rptr. 674, 680 (1990)
(noting that section 351 was "penalizing a defendant for having taken a legitimate four-day vacation
out of state long before the statute ran... [and] ... rewarding a tardy plaintiff who has failed to file
an action within the statutory period").
17. See infra notes 212-214 and accompanying text (discussing solutions to the problems
created by section 351).
18. See infra notes 22-56 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 57-185 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 186-211 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 212-214 and accompanying text.
1641
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I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
To understand how developments in the law of in personam
jurisdiction have eradicated the need for the section 351 tolling
provision, it is important to analyze the statute of limitations
defense and the reasons why statutes similar to section 351 were
enacted. A statute of limitations is any statute defining a prescribed
time period during which a litigant may file a substantive claim or
enforce a specific right.' The United States Supreme Court has
noted that the basic policy underlying statutes of limitations is to
further justice by preventing defendants from being surprised by
the restoration of claims that have laid dormant until evidence has
been misplaced, witnesses have disappeared, and facts have been
forgotten.23 The theory behind a statute of limitations, according
the Supreme Court, is that over time an aggrieved party's right to
bring a law suit is outweighed by the strong policy against
burdening a defendant with an ancient claim.'
However, if the plaintiff is physically unable to bring his or her
cause of action due to a disability,25 it would be unjust to
extinguish the cause of action for the plaintiff's failure to comply
22. See BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 927 (6th ed. 1990) (defining statute of limitations). See
also Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879) (stating that statutes of limitations stimulate
plaintiffs to file actions promptly and punish plaintiffs that negligently delay in filing).
23. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944).
The Court held that even when the plaintiff has a just claim, it is unjust not to put the defendant on
notice within the limitations period. d.
24. See Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879) (noting that by barring a party's cause
of action, legislatures have determined that the right to be free of a stale claim outweighs the right
to pursue that claim where a significant amount of time has passed). The Wood Court's holding relied
on the policy that a statute of limitations promotes stability since a person can be secure that past
claims, forgotten with the passage of time, will not surprise him or her at some point in the future.
I& at 139. Cf Wooded Shores Property Owners Assn, Inc. v. Mathews, 37 Ill. App. 3d 334, 345
N.E.2d 186, 189 (1976) (stating that the defense of laches, similar to a statute of limitations, is based
upon the notion that the law aids those who are timely in pursuing their rights and not those who
slumber on their rights). But cf Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946) (holding that the
defense of laches is not like a statute of limitations because it does not deal with a mere time
limitation but instead with a question of the inequity of permitting the claim to be enforced when
some change in the conditions or relations of the property or the parties has taken place).
25. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 461 (6th ed. 1990) (defining disability as "[t]he want of
legal capability to perform an act"). See also Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428
(1965) (noting that a disability occurs when a plaintiff has not slept on his or her rights but, rather
has been prevented from asserting them).
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with the applicable statute of limitations.26 This idea has long
been recognized by state legislatures, which have provided
exceptions to the general time limitations where a plaintiff is
unable to comply with the applicable statute of limitations because
of a specified disability.2 7 For example, in California, section 351
considers a plaintiff to be under such a disability when the party
against whom the plaintiff has a claim cannot be found within the
plaintiff's state of residence.28 The key to understanding why the
California Legislature considered a plaintiff to be under a disability
if the defendant was not physically present in the state is found in
a close analysis of state courts' jurisdiction at the time section 351
was enacted.
The purpose behind the tolling provision in California Code of
Civil Procedure section 351 relates back to the doctrine introduced
in Pennoyer v. Neff.29 In Pennoyer, the United States Supreme
Court determined that no state could establish in personam
jurisdiction ° over a party beyond its territorial limits.31  The
26. See generally Blankenship, For Whom the Statute Tolls-The Statute of Limitations as
Applied to Foreign Defendants in Countries Which do not Permit Service by Mail, 27 SANTA CLARA
L REv. 765, 767-68 (1987) (noting that the policy behind statutes of limitations can only be served
if the plaintiff has the ability to bring his or her cause of action).
27. See e.g., CAL. Ctv. PRoc. CODE § 337(3) (West Supp. 1992) (providing that when the
plaintiff has not yet discovered the facts constituting the fraud or mistake which has been perpetrated
against him or her, that plaintiff is under a disability and the statute of limitations is tolled); CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 352(a) (West Supp. 1992) (providing that plaintiff is under a disability if he or
she is under the age of majority, insane or imprisoned on a criminal charge, and the time in which
they are under such a disability is not a part of the time limited for the instigation of their cause of
action).
28. See at. § 351 (West Supp. 1992) (providing that plaintiff is under a disability and the
statute of limitations is tolled when a defendant cannot be found within the state).
29. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
30. See J. FRiEDENHI-A, supra note 13 at 98 (West Publishing Co. 1985) (defiming in
personam jurisdiction as jurisdiction over a person which allows a court to subject that person to its
decision-making power). The Pennoyer Court defined personal jurisdiction over a party, or an in
personam action, as jurisdiction to determine the personal rights and obligations of that party.
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722. The Court distinguished this from an in rem action which involves a
proceeding where property is brought under the control of the court, or where the judgment is sought
as a means of reaching such property or effectuating some interest therein. Id. at 734.
31. Id. at 722. Pennoyer involved a suit brought in Oregon to recover legal fees allegedly
owed to the plaintiff, a resident of Oregon, by the defendant, a nonresident owning land in Oregon.
Xa at 719-20. The defendant was served by publication and the plaintiff obtained a default judgment.
Id. at 720. The Oregon court ordered the defendant's land sold at a sheriff's sale to satisfy the
judgment, and the plaintiff purchased the land at the sale. Id. at 719. The defendant subsequently
1643
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Court reasoned that every state possesses exclusive jurisdiction and
sovereignty over persons and property within its territory and
therefore no state can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over
persons or property outside of its territory.32 Holding that process
sent out of state to a nonresident is ineffective to confer in
personam jurisdiction, the Pennoyer Court reasoned that in an
action to determine a defendant's in personam liability, the
defendant must be brought within the state court's jurisdiction by
service of process within the state or by the defendant's voluntary
appearance.
33
The holding in Pennoyer created a situation where a state
resident was unable to pursue a cause of action against a
nonresident, if the latter left the state after the cause of action
accrued, because the state court could not obtain in personam
jurisdiction over the nonresident. 4 Without the enactment of
tolling provisions such as section 351, a defendant could avoid
liability by simply remaining outside the state where the cause of
action accrued until the applicable statute of limitations ran, thereby
escaping accountability for his or her conduct. This result left a
resident plaintiff, often times unable or unwilling to pursue a
defendant in that defendant's state of residence, without means of
redressing the injury.
35
learned of the sale and brought suit in Oregon to recover possession of his property, alleging that the
court ordering the sale had never acquired in personam jurisdiction over him and therefore could not
adjudicate the personal rights and obligations between the defendant and the plaintiff. Id. at 720. On
this basis the plaintiff claimed the default judgment had been improperly entered. 1la
32. Id. at 722. The Pennoyer Court ultimately held that although service of process by
publication is effectual in a proceeding in rem, such service is ineffectual to confer jurisdiction over
a nonresident defendant in an in personam action. Id. at 727. In applying the service of process rules
to the facts of the case, the Court determined that although the suit ultimately involved the sale of
property, the initial money judgment was rendered in an in personam action against the defendant,
and therefore the publication of process was insufficient to give the state court jurisdiction over the
defendant. Id at 728.
33. Id at 733. The Court held that without jurisdiction, due process is not satisfied and the
action is constitutionally impennissible. Id. at 734.
34. See id at 722 (holding that a party had to be physically present within the state for
effective service of process).
35. See Halper, Limitations of Actions-Absence of the Defendant: Tolling the Statute of
Limitations on a Foreign Cause ofAction, I UCLA L. REV. 619, 619-20 (1954) (noting that before
enactment of tolling provisions like section 351, resident plaintiffs often could not maintain a legal
action against a nonresident defendant before the applicable statute of limitations foreclosed that
1644
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In essence, by not allowing a state court to extend its in
personam jurisdiction outside of its borders, the holding in
Pennoyer forced states to devise statutory provisions which
preserved a resident plaintiff's claim until it could be initiated. 6
Section 351, and tolling provisions like it, served this need
effectively by tolling statute of limitations until the state court
could obtain in personam jurisdiction over the defendant, thereby
allowing the plaintiff to initiate his or her action.37 By tolling a
statute of limitations while a defendant was absent from the state,
state legislatures were able to ensure that a resident of the state
would not be denied his or her cause of action due to an inability
to comply with a statute of limitations.
Nineteenth century America was very provincial and state-
oriented in character, and the jurisdictional doctrine set forth in
Pennoyer, which was based on a state's power within its own
territory, served the needs of that type of society relatively well.38
However, as time passed, and the United States moved into the
twentieth century, society became more mobile and the focus in
commerce and politics came to rest on the nation as a whole rather
than on each individual state.39 The inflexible jurisdictional
doctrine espoused in Pennoyer no longer met the needs of this
changing society.40 The introduction of quicker, more efficient
action).
36. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 734. The Court held that before a state court can adjudicate a
claim, due process of law requires appearance or personal service before the defendant can be
personally bound by any judgment rendered. Ia The Court further held that such personal service
must be made within the state to be valid. Id at 733.
37. See Dew v. Appleberry, 23 Cal. 3d 630,634,591 P.2d 509,511, 153 Cal. Rptr. 219,221
(1979). The court noted that section 351 was enacted to prevent a claim from being barred simply
because the defendant, being outside the state, could not be served with a summons and complaint
in an in personam action. Id
38. See J. F rEDENTrAL, supra note 13, at 123 (noting that after Pennoyer, court began
creating exceptions to the physical presence rule which "reflected judges' attempts to tailor
nineteenth century jurisdictional doctrine to fit the realities of the twentieth century").
39. See id. at 123 (discussing how changes in society caused emphasis to fall on the nation
as a single economic entity rather than just a collection of individual state economies).
40. See i at 123 (discussing the United States Supreme Court's recognition that the realities
of twentieth century America rendered the Pennoyer rule an anachronism because the inflexible,
territorial based jurisdiction rules could not adequately serve a society that was becoming interstate
in character).
1645
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interstate transportation greatly increased travel between states as
well as the volume of interstate business transactions.4 Such
increases in interstate travel and commerce resulted in frequent
contact between state residents and nonresidents, necessarily
leading to increased incidents of the residents initiating legal
actions against nonresidents in the resident's state courts. This
increased litigation between residents and nonresidents created a
greater need for state courts to obtain in personam jurisdiction over
nonresidents.42
In an effort to facilitate litigation, state legislatures enacted
statutes allowing state courts to obtain in personam jurisdiction
over nonresidents. 3 One such statute implied the consent of a
nonresident to a state official serving as an agent upon whom
process could be served.' Another provision that expanded a
state's ability to obtain in personam jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants was created when the United States Supreme Court
upheld the validity of a Washington long-arm statute in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington.45
In International Shoe, the Supreme Court moved away from the
concept developed in Pennoyer requiring physical presence within
the state as a prerequisite for obtaining in personam jurisdiction.46
41. See id. at 123 (noting the increased mobility of society in the time period following the
Pennoyer decision).
42. See id at 102-104 (noting that exceptions to the rigid territoriality rule of Pennoyer
became necessary to bring jurisdiction in line with changes occurring in the areas of transportation
and communication and in the basic mode of transacting business).
43. See infra note 49 (setting forth various methods state legislatures used to bring nonresident
defendants within the jurisdiction of the state courts).
44. See Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916) (upholding a New Jersey statute requiring
nonresidents to register with the Secretary of State designating such official as an agent upon whom
process could be served in actions arising within the state); see also Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352,
355-57 (1927) (finding that a statutory scheme in which simply by using the roads and highways of
a state a nonresident motorist would be deemed to have consented to the appointment of a state
official as an agent upon whom process could be served upon was not inconsistent with due process).
45. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
46. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. The case involved a Washington statute that set up
a scheme of unemployment compensation which required contributions by employers. Id. at 311. The
statute authorized the State Commissioner to issue an order and notice of assessment of delinquent
contributions by mailing the notice to nonresident employers. Iht at 312. The defendant, a Delaware
Corporation with its principal place of business in Missouri, employed between eleven and thirteen
salespersons in Washington and had not been contributing to the state unemployment scheme. Id. at
1646
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In departing from the physical presence requirement, the Court
established that a state court could subject a person outside the
territorial limits of its borders to service of process if there were
specified minimum contacts with the state,47 such that the
maintenance of the suit did not violate "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice. ' , 48 The Court in International Shoe
held that when these minimum contacts were established between
a defendant and the state asserting jurisdiction, due process of law
would not be violated by allowing alternative service of process49
upon a defendant not physically present in the state.50
Long arm statutes and alternative methods of service of process
increase the ability of state courts to obtain in personam
jurisdiction over both nonresident individuals and foreign
corporations, because defendants no longer have to be present
within the state to be served with process.51 Moreover, long arm
statutes increase a party's ability to litigate where constitutional
312-13. In response to defendants delinquent contributions, the plaintiff served notice of assessment
upon one of defendant's salespersons, and a copy of the notice was sent by registered mail to
defendant's Missouri address. I. at 312.
47. Id at 318-19. The Court clarified the term minimum contacts by adding that these contacts
must be such as to make it reasonable, in the context of the federal system and due process of law
requirements, to expect a defendant corporation to defend the suit brought in the state asserting
jurisdiction. Id. The International Shoe Court further noted satisfaction of due process depends on
the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws. Id.
at 319. Even single or occasional acts may, because of their nature, quality and circumstances, be
deemed sufficient to render a corporation liable to suit. Id at 318.
48. Id. at 316. The Court found that given the facts of the case, the defendant's activities were
both systematic and continuous and it's obligations arose out of these activities. Id. at 320. Therefore,
these activities were adequate to establish sufficient contacts to make it reasonable to permit plaintiff
to enforce the obligations defendants incurred in Washington. Id. at 321.
49. J. FRmDENTHAL, supra note 13, at 169. Alternative or constructive service of process, not
requiring that the defendant be personally served with process, can satisfy due process requirements.
id. Forms of alternative service of process include leaving the process at the defendant's home,
mailing the process to the defendant, or in some circumstances, publishing the contents of the
summons in a newspaper for a prescribed number of times. Id See also infra note 75 and
accompanying text (setting out the California statutory scheme that provides for alternative service
of process).
50. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. See U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § I (providing that
no state may "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
51. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
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proscription of extraterritorial service of process, as established in
Pennoyer, previously prevented such litigation.52
In cases following International Shoe, the Supreme Court
further refined the constitutional limits of long arm statutes by
clarifying what contacts were required between a state and a
nonresident defendant in order for the state to assert in personam
jurisdiction.5' The International Shoe decision, and the cases that
followed,54 validated the expansion of state court jurisdiction, and
motivated state legislatures to enact extensive jurisdictional
legislation based on the defendant's activities in, or contacts with,
the forum state.55 The prevalence of long arm statutes in state
statutory law and the expanded jurisdiction of state courts that such
statutes confer, in conjunction with the development of alternative
service of process, significantly decreased, or even eliminated, the
52. See Kurland, The Supreme Court; the Due Process Clause and the In Personam
Jursdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CI. L. REv. 569, 586 (1958) (noting the expansion in a resident
plaintiffs ability to sue out-of-state defendants since the Supreme Court's holding in International
Shoe).
53. See Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (holding that
a substantial connection between defendant and the forum state must come about by action of the
defendant purposefully directed toward the forum state in order to satisfy the minimum contacts
requirement set forth in International Shoe); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 292 (1980) (holding that even though a defendant could foresee the entry of its product into
Oldahoma, this was not enough without evidence that the defendant had availed herself of the
privileges and benefits of the forum state's law, to establish minimum contacts with Oklahoma,
despite the fact that the cause of action arose in Oklahoma); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84,
94-96 (1978) (holding that the defendant's act of sending his daughter to California to live with her
mother connoted neither intent to obtain nor expectation to receive any benefits of California's laws,
therefore no minimum contacts existed with California); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253
(1958) (holding that the unilateral act of the settlor of a trust exercising her power of appointment
in Florida, was not enough to create sufficient contacts with Florida for the purpose of obtaining
jurisdiction over the trustee); McGee v. International Life Insurance Company, 355 U.S. 220, 226
(1957) (holding that for the purposes of due process, a suit based on a single contact which had
substantial connection with the state's courts was sufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts
requirement).
54. See supra note 53 (identifying the cases following International Shoe that developed the
constitutional limits of long-arm statutes and refined the rule created by the Supreme Court in
International Shoe).
55. See J. FRI EWETHAL, supra note 13, at 139-40 (discussing the increased use of long arm
statutes by state courts). See also infra note 74 (providing California's long-arm statute).
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need for statutes which toll a statute of limitations during the time
in which a defendant is not present within the forum state.56
11. CASE LAW AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 351
Section 351 provides that when a cause of action accrues
against a party, and that party is not in the state or leaves the state
after the action accrues, the statute of limitations is tolled.57 As a
result, a defendant asserting a statute of limitations defense may not
include the time he or she was absent from the state as part of the
time prescribed in the statute of limitations.58 For the purposes of
section 351, a defendant is outside of the state not only where the
defendant resides outside of California, but also during brief trips
outside of the state.59 In addition, the general language of section
351 does not limit the statute's application to any one class of
defendant or cause of action.6° However, in applying section 351,
courts have distinguished between individual, or non-corporate
defendants, and corporate defendants. 61
56. See infra notes 188-214 and accompanying text (discussing the decreasing need ofsection
351 in California and proposing solutions to the problems created by section 351). See Mounts v.
Uyeda, 272 Cal. Rptr. 876, 881 (1990) (King, J., concurring), reh'g granted, 277 Cal. App. 3d 111,
277 Cal. Rptr. 730 (1991). The concurring opinion notes that a California statutory provision tolling
the statute of limitations during the period when a defendant was out of state may have been logical
when long-arm statutes did not exist and a resident plaintiff could not serve an absent defendant by
substituted service or by publication. Id, The concurrence further indicated that today section 351
makes no sense and should be repealed. Id,
57. CAI. CIV. PROc. CODE § 351 (West Supp. 1992).
58. Id
59. See Mounts v. Uyeda, 227 Cal. App. 3d 111, 114,277 Cal. Rptr. 730,732 (1991) (tolling
the statute of limitations for a four day period in which the defendant traveled outside of California);
O'Laskey v. Sortino, 224 Cal. App. 3d 241, 245-46, 273 Cal. Rptr. 674, 676 (1990) (tolling the
statute of limitations for a two week period in which the defendant was vacationing in Las Vegas);
Dew v. Appleberry, 23 Cal. 3d 630, 633, 591 P.2d 509, 510-11, 153 Cal. Rptr. 219, 221 (1979)
(tolling the statute of limitations for a five week period in which the defendant was in Ohio visiting
his parents).
60. CAL. Qiv. PRoc. CODE § 351 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991). The language of section 351
does not distinguish between non-corporate and corporate defendants, or between resident and
nonresident defendants. Id. Additionally, section 351 does not specify what type of statute of
limitations or cause of action it applies. See kd
61. See infra notes 129-136 and accompanying text (discussing section 351 inapplicability to
corporate defendants).
1649
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A. Section 351 Applied to Individual Defendants
In the case of non-corporate defendants, section 351 tolls the
statute of limitations while the individual, or non-corporate entity,
is outside of the state.62 However, section 351 will not toll a
statute of limitations for nonresident motorists,63  limited
partnerships,64 and non-corporate parties involved in interstate
commerce.65 Other than these exceptions, California courts have
consistently upheld the propriety of section 351 in cases involving
non-corporate defendants.' The expansion of state courts' ability
to assert in personam jurisdiction as developed by the Supreme
Court since Pennoyer however, caused the California Supreme
Court, in Dew v. Appleberny,67 to review the continued validity of
section 351.'
62. CAL. Civ. PROc. CODE § 351 (West Supp. 1992). See Dew, 23 Cal. 3d at 637, 591 P.2d
at 514, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 223-24 (holding that in cases involving non-corporate defendants, the time
in which a defendant is absent from the state is not part of the time limited for the commencement
of the action). See also infra notes 63-128 and accompanying text (discussing the application of
section 351 to individual defendants).
63. See Bigelow v. Smik, 6 Cal. App. 3d 10, 15, 85 Cal. Rptr. 613, 616 (1970) (holding that
section 351 does not apply to nonresident motorists). See also infra notes 97-108 and accompanying
text (discussing the inapplicability of section 351 to nonresident motorists).
64. See Epstein v. Frank, 125 Cal. App. 3d 111, 120,177 Cal. Rptr. 831, 835 (1981) (holding
section 351 inapplicable to limited partnerships when the sole general partner is absent from the
state). See also infra notes 137-141 and accompanying text (discussing the inapplicability of section
351 to a limited partnership).
65. See Abramson v. Brownstein, 897 F.2d 389, 393 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding section 351
unconstitutional in situations involving interstate commerce). See infra notes 171-179 and
accompanying text (discussing the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals finding that section 351 is an
impermissible burden on interstate commerce).
66. See, e.g., Mounts v. Uyeda, 277 Cal. App. 3d 111, 122, 277 Cal. Rptr. 730, 738 (1991)
(applying section 351 in a case involving a state resident who left the state for a four day period);
O'Laskey v. Sortino, 224 Cal. App. 3d 241,251-52,273 Cal. Rptr. 674,680 (1990) (applying section
351 in a case involving a defendant who was absent from the state for two weeks during the running
of the statute of limitations); Kohan v. Cohan, 204 Cal. App. 3d 915,921 251 Cal. Rptr. 570,573-74
(1988) (upholding the applicability of section 351 in a case involving a claim which arose in a
foreign country); Dew v. Appleberry, 23 Cal. 3d 630, 637, 591 P.2d 509, 513, 153 Cal. Rptr. 219,
223-24 (1979) (applying section 351 in a case involving a defendant who left the state for a five
week period during the running of the statute of limitations).
67. 23 Cal. 3d 630, 591 P.2d 509, 153 Cal. Rptr. 219 (1979).
68. See id. at 636, 591 P.2d at 513, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 223 (holding that a defendant's
amenability to service of process was irrelevant to the application of the section 351 tolling
provision). See infra note 69-87 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning behind the holding
in Dew).
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1. Effect of Expansion of State Court Jurisdiction on the
Applicability of Section 351
Dew involved a personal injury claim in which the plaintiff
was injured in a fall on the defendant's property on September 23,
1973.69 The plaintiff did not file suit until September 24, 1974, a
year and one day after the cause of action accrued." The
defendant's answer to the plaintiffs complaint asserted that the
claim was barred by the one year statute of limitations applicable
to negligence actions.7' During the pleading stage of the action,
the defendant admitted to being outside of California on a five
week vacation during the year in which the statute of limitations
was running.72 However, at all times during that one year period,
including the five week absence from the state, the defendant was
amenable to alternate service of process and a personal judgment
could have been obtained against him."h
The plaintiff argued that, pursuant to section 351, the time the
defendant was absent from the state after the cause of action
accrued was not part of the time provided for in the applicable
statute of limitations.74 Addressing plaintiff's contention, the
defendant argued that section 351 should not apply to the pending
action because California legislation passed after the enactment of
section 351 provides for alternate methods of service' sufficient
69. Dew, 23 Cal. 3d at 632-33, 591 P.2d at 511, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
70. d
71. Id. at 633,591 P.2d at511, 153 Cal. Rptr. at220. See CAL Cv. PRoc. CoDE § 340 (West
Supp. 1992) (providing, in part, that the statute of limitations for an injury caused by the wrongful
act or neglect of another is one year).
72. Dew, 23 Cal. 3d at 633, 591 P.2d at 511, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
73. Id at 633-34, 591 P.2d at 511, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 221. The defendant was a permanent
resident of California residing in San Francisco with his wife and children at the time of, and for the
entire year following, the accident and owned property where the accident occurred. Id. at 633.
Furthermore, during the defendant's brief absences from the state of California, he maintained the
same business and residential address as he had at the time of the accident. Id
74. Id. at 633, 591 P.2d at 511, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 220-221.
75. Several statutes have been enacted in California providing for alternative methods of
service of process on a defendant who is absent from the state. See CAt. Civ. PROC. CoDE § 415.20
(West Supp. 1992) (providing that a summons and complaint may be served by leaving a copy at the
office, dwelling house, usual place of abode or usual place of business of the person to be served);
id. §§ 415.30, 415.40 (West Supp. 1992) (providing that a summons and complaint may be served
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to confer jurisdiction upon the court to enter a personal judgment
against a defendant who cannot be found within the state.76 The
defendant contended that the alternate methods of service available
to a plaintiff negated the underlying policy, and therefore, the
necessity of section 35 1.
7
The California Supreme Court affirmed the plaintiff's use of
section 351, holding that section 351 was not dependant on the
availability of alternative service on a defendant.78 The court
reasoned that the legislature may have reasonably concluded that
a plaintiff may be impeded by a defendant's absence from the state,
and that it would be inequitable to compel a plaintiff to pursue that
defendant out of state in order to comply with the applicable statute
of limitations. 79  For this reason, the court found that the
defendant's amenability to service of process is irrelevant in the
determination of whether section 351 should be applied.8"
Therefore, the Dew court concluded that there was not an
irreconcilable conflict between section 351 and the statutes
governing substituted service.8t The court harmonized section 351
with the statutes governing substituted service by concluding that
by mailing a copy to the party within or without the state); iU § 415.50 (West Supp. 1992)
(providing that a summons and complaint may be served by publication "in a named newspaper,
published in this state, that is most likely to give actual notice to the party to be served"); id. §
410.10 (West Supp. 1992). (setting forth the California long ann statute which provides for the
exercise of jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the state or federal constitution).
76. Dew, 23 Cal. 3d at 633-34, 591 P.2d at 511-12, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 221-222.
77. I, at 633, 591 P.2d at 511, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 221. See Schneider v. Schneider, 82 Cal.
App. 2d 860,862, 187 P.2d 459 (1947) (noting that the policy underlying section 351 was to prevent
the statute of limitations from barring a claim simply because the plaintiff was unable to serve the
defendant with process due to the defendant's absence from the state).
78. Dew, 23 Cal. 3d at 636, 591 P.2d at 513, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 222-23. The Supreme Court
reversed the trial court's order granting summary judgment for defendant and dismissing plaintiffs
complaint. Id at 632, 591 P.2d at 510, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
79. Id at 636, 591 P.2d at 513, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
80. d at 635-36, 591 P.2d at 513, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 222-23. See Garcia v. Flores, 64 Cal.
App. 3d 705, 709, 134 Cal. Rptr. 712, 714 (1976) (holding that a court should look at whether the
defendant is physically present in California, rather than whether the defendant is amenable to service
of process, in determining the applicability of section 351).
81. Dew, 23 Cal. 3d at 635-36, 591 P.2d at 513, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 222-23. See supra note 49
and accompanying text (discussing various types of substituted service of process).
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the latter was simply an effort by the legislature to encourage a
plaintiff to adjudicate his or her claim promptly if possible.82
In addressing the defendant's argument that section 351 was an
unconstitutional infringement upon the right to travel freely, the
Dew court relied on an analogy to section 802 of the California
Penal Code,83 which is a tolling provision similar to section 351
that applies to criminal proceedings." In Scherling v. Superior
Court,85 the court found that because the section 802 tolling
provision did not subject a criminal defendant to an enhanced
penalty, section 802 in no way impinged on a defendants right to
travel freely. 6 The court in Dew found that section 351, like
section 802, did not subject defendants to an enhanced penalty if
they left the state after the cause of action accrued, therefore
section 351 did not impinge on the constitutional right to free
travel.87 The Dew decision focused on section 351 when used by
a plaintiff in a state action, however, the applicability of section
351 has been at issue in actions based in federal law as well.
82. Dew, 23 Cal. 3d at 636,591 P.2d at 513, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 223. The Dew court determined
that the statutes governing substituted service of process lessen the need for section 351, but do not
eliminate the need. Id. The court further noted that the statutes governing substituted service are
primarily an effort by the legislature to ensure the plaintiff a quick adjudication if possible, and were
by no means enacted to repeal section 351. Id
83. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 803(d) (West Supp. 1992) (providing that if a criminal defendant
is out of state when or after an offense is committed, the time during which he or she is absent is
not to be computed as part of the limitations period).
84. Dew, 23 Cal. 3d at 636, 591 P.2d at 513,153 Cal. Rptr. at 223. See L. TRmg, AMERICAN
CONSITUTIONAL LAw 528-530 (The Foundation Press, Inc. 1988) (discussing the privileges and
immunities clause of Article IV, § 2 of the United States Constitution and its guarantee of the
fundamental right of a citizen of one state to pass through or reside in any other state).
85. 22 Cal. 3d 493, 585 P.2d 219, 149 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1978).
86. Id at 502,585 P.2d at 224, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 602. The California Supreme Court held that
section 802 did not substantially impinge on the fundamental right to travel freely because the
defendant was not subjected to a greater penalty, he was only faced with a tolled statutory period of
limitations. Id at 500, 585 P.2d at 223, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 601.
87. Dew, 23 Cal. 3d at 636-37, 591 P.2d at 513, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 223. The California
Supreme Court noted that section 351 is identical to section 802 in that it does not subject the
defendant to a greater penalty if he or she leaves California, it merely tolls the statute of limitation.
Id. See also Kohan v. Cohan, 204 Cal. App. 3d 915,923,251 Cal. Rptr. 570,575 (1988). The court
in Kohan noted that section 351 does not deprive nonresidents of the benefits of the statute of
limitations. Id Rather, the court felt that it excludes from computation the time during which any
defendant, resident or nonresident, may have been out of the state. Id
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2. Viability of Section 351 in Actions Based on Federal Law
The application of section 351 in actions based on federal
law 8 has also been found to be valid, in spite of arguments that
a defendant's amenability to alternate service of process should
render section 351 inapplicable.8 9 The general rule regarding the
application of section 351 to cases involving federal claims against
non-corporate defendants, is that section 351 must be applied by
federal courts when such application is consistent with constitution
or other federal law.'
In Maurer v. Individually and as Members of Los Angeles
County Sheriff's Department,9 ' the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit was presented with the issue of whether section 351 could
be applied in a federal civil rights action.' Upholding the use of
section 351, the court found that the purpose behind section 351
was not inconsistent with the policies of deterrence and
compensation embodied in the civil rights laws, 42 U.S.C. 1983."a
88. "Actions based on federal law" as used in this section refers to claims based on federal
statutory law. See BLACK'S LAw DIcTIoNARY 610 (6th ed. 1990) (defining federal acts as statutes
enected by Congress, relating to matters within authority delegated to the federal government by the
United States Constitution).
89. See Maurer v. Individually and as Members of Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Department, 691 F.2d 434,436-37 (9th Cir. 1982) (upholding validity of section 351 in an action for
damages for an alleged violation of defendants civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985).
90. See Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 484-85 (1980) (holding that a federal
court must uphold state tolling provisions, where applicable and where they are not inconsistent with
the Constitution or other federal law).
91. 691 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1982).
92. Id at 436. The plaintiff in Maurer was allegedly assaulted by members of the Los Angeles
Police Department during an arrest. Id at 435. After being acquitted on the charges that arose from
his arrest, the plaintiff filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3) against the police
officers involved in his arrest, seeking damages for a violation of his civil rights. Id The district court
dismissed the action against the police officers on the ground that it was "barred by California's
three-year statute of limitations governing actions founded on a liability created by statute." Id The
plaintiff asserted that the statute of limitations was tolled under section 351 due to the absence of a
defendant from the state. Id at 436. The district court refused to apply section 351 because it
concluded that "a state statute that tolled the limitations period for a defendant who was continuously
available for substituted service of process was inconsistent with the policies underlying section 1983
as an independent federal remedy." Id
93. Id at 436. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) (providing that any person who is denied any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws under the color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any state, shall have an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress).
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The court in Maurer recognized that federal courts' reliance on
state tolling provisions may eliminate nation-wide uniformity in
federal decisions relating to the application of state tolling
provisions, but the court upheld California's determination that the
defendant's amenability to service of process was irrelevant under
section 351. 94
Both Maurer and Dew expressly upheld the broad language of
section 351 through their validation of the use of the tolling
provision, despite a defendant's amenability to service of
process.95 Although this broad language has remained unchanged
since the enactment of section 351 in 1892, the legislature has
recognized that the application of section 351 is inequitable in
certain situations and has, through subsequent legislation,
eliminated the use of section 351 in cases involving nonresident
motorists."
3. Section 351 Applied to Nonresident Motorists
In Bigelow v. Smik,97 the California Second District Court of
Appeal found that the application of section 17454 of the
California Vehicle Code98 effectively eliminated the need for the
94. Maurer, 691 F.2d at 436-37. The court relied on the California Supreme Court's
determination in Dew v. Appleberry, 23 Cal. 3d 630, 637, 591 P.2d 509, 514, 153 Cal. Rptr. 219,
223-24 (1979), that section 351 applies regardless of whether the defendant is amenable to service
of process during his absence from the state. Maurer, 691 F.2d at 436.
95. Both Maurer and Dew based their respective holdings on the rationale that the California
Legislature may have found there is a need for section 351 despite the alternative methods of serving
process. See Dew, 23 Cal. 3d at 636, 591 P.2d at 513, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 223 (noting that the
legislature may have justifiably have concluded that defendant's physical absence impedes the
defendant's availability for suit, and that it would be inequitable to force a claimant to pursue the
defendant out of state in order effectively to commence an action within the limitations period).
96. See Dew, 23 Cal. 3d at 634-35, 591 P.2d at 512, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 222 (noting that the
California Legislature passed legislation that has, in effect, rendered section 351 inapplicable to
nonresident motorists). See also infra notes 98-101 and accompanying text (laying out the applicable
section of the California Vehicle Code that renders section 351 inapplicable to nonresident motorists).
97. 6 Cal. App. 3d 10, 85 Cal. Rptr. 613 (1970).
98. See CAL. Vmr. CODE § 17454 (West Supp. 1992). The statute provides that, in situations
involving a plaintiffs claim against a nonresident motorist:
[s]ervice of process shall be made by leaving one copy of the summons and complaint in
the hands of the director or in his office at Sacramento or by mailing either by certified
or registered mail, addressee only, return receipt requested, the copy of the summons and
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application of section 351 in situations involving nonresident
motorists by subjecting the defendant motorist to alternative service
of process despite his or her absence from California. 9 In
Bigelow, the plaintiffs were injured in an automobile accident in
Los Angeles, California, on August 20, 1963.'00 A few days after
the accident the defendant, a resident of Ohio, left California and
did not return."' On October 8, 1964, the plaintiffs filed suit in
a California district court against the defendant and served the
defendant with process in the manner provided by Vehicle Code
section 17454."°  However, because the action was not
commenced within the one year period prescribed by the
appropriate statute of limitations, 10 3 plaintiffs relied on section
351 in an effort to excuse the failure to comply with the statute of
limitations. 1
4
The Bigelow court rejected the plaintiff's argument, stating that
because a nonresident defendant has an agent authorized to accept
process on his behalf in California, there was no reason for
suspending the period of limitations for commencing an action
against the defendant.0" The Bigelow court reasoned that because
complaint to the office of the director in Sacramento.
Id.
99. Bigelow, 6 Cal. App. 3d at 14,85 Cal. Rptr. at616. See CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 17450-17463
(West 1959 & Supp. 1992) (statutory scheme governing actions against nonresident motorists). See
also infra notes 100-108 and accompanying text (discussing the Bigelow court's reasoning in
concluding that section 17454 of the California Vehicle Code eliminated the need for section 351 in
situations involving nonresident motorists).
100. Bigelow, 6 Cal. App. 3d at 12, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
101. Id. at 12,85 Cal. Rptr. at 614. See CAL. VE. CODE § 17450 (West Supp. 1992) (defining
nonresident, for the purposes of the vehicle code, as a person who is not a resident of the state of
California at the time the accident or collision occurs).
102. Bigelow, 6 Cal. App. 3d at 12, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 614. See supra note 98 (providing the
language in section 17454 of the California Vehicle Code).
103. Bigelow, 6 Cal. App. 3d at 12, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 614. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340(3)
(West Supp. 1992) (providing a one year statute of limitations in actions for the injury to, or for the
death of, one caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another).
104. Bigelow, 6 Cal. App. 3d at 12, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
105. Id. at 13-14, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 615-16. The court relied on Solot v. Linch, 46 Cal. 2d 99,
105, 292 P.2d 887, 890 (1956), where the California Supreme Court held that the statutory scheme
providing for substitute service of process in cases involving nonresident motorists had the same legal
force and validity as personal service of process within the state. 1d. See Scorza v. Deatherage, 208
F.2d 660, 662 (8th Cir. 1947). The Eighth Circuit found that service on an agent authorized to accept
such service is equivalent to personal service upon the principal of that agent. I, The court in Scorza
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substitute service of process on a nonresident motorist was
available through section 17454 of the California Vehicle Code, the
legislature must have concluded that exceptions to section 351
would be implied automatically in all instances where statutory
provisions had been made for alternative service of process within
the state. " The court added that if the legislature had provided
an express statutory exception from the suspension provisions of
section 351 for one group of defendants, it may have been
misinterpreted by courts to exclude other groups of nonresidents
susceptible to service of process within the state from being
similarly excepted. 7
The effect of the court's decision in Bigelow is that nonresident
motorists are considered to be amenable to service of process
within the state, and therefore the period of limitations is not tolled
because section 351 does not apply.108 California courts have
refused, however, to apply the logic used in Bigelow, that
amenability to service of process renders section 351 inapplicable
to out-of-state defendants, in cases not involving nonresident
motorists."° In some instances, California courts have even
expanded the application of section 351 to encompass situations
added that authority sustains this view, and hence the statute of limitations was not tolled while
service of process could have been made on the nonresident motorist's authorized agent in the state.
Id at 662-663.
106. Bigelow, 6 Cal. App. 3d at 14-15, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 616.
107. Id at 14-15, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 616. The court noted that the legislature may well have
concluded that exceptions to the suspension provision of section 351 would be implied automatically
in all instances where statutory provision had been made for service of process within the state. Id
The reason for this may have been that the legislature may have feared that an express statutory
exception from the suspension provisions of section 351 for one group might carry implications that
other groups of nonresidents susceptible to service of process within the state had not been similarly
excepted. Id at 15, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 616.
108. Id at 15, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 616.
109. See, e.g., Mounts v. Uyeda, 227 Cal. App. 3d 111, 115,277 Cal. Rptr. 730, 732 (1991)
(holding that defendant, a resident motorist who was absent from California for a four day period,
was subject to the section 351 tolling provision despite his amenability to service of process during
his absence from the state); Dew v. Appleberry, 23 Cal. 3d 630, 637, 591 P.2d 509, 514, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 219,223-24 (1979) (holding that a defendant who was amenable to service of process during
his one month absence from the state, was nevertheless subject to the section 351 tolling provision).
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where the defendant has never been physically present in
California.
110
4. Section 351 Applied to Defendants Who Have Never Been
Physically Present in the State
California courts have consistently held that section 351 tolls
a statute of limitations in cases where the defendant is out of state
when the cause of action accrued.' Recently, section 351 was
extended to apply to situations in which all parties, both plaintiff
and defendant, were residing out of state at the time the cause of
action accrued and only subsequently moved to California."12 In
Kohan v. Cohan,"3 the California Second District Court of
Appeals addressed the issue of whether section 351 applied to
situations in which all parties resided outside of California at the
time the cause of action accrued."
4
In Kohan, three brothers began a partnership in Iran in 1961,
and successfully transacted business in that country until the
Iranian Revolution of 1978-79, at which time the brothers
immigrated to California." 5 In 1982, two of the brothers,
110. See Kohan v. Cohan, 204 Cal. App. 3d 915,923,251 Cal. Rptr. 570,574 (1988) (holding
that section 351 applies where both parties do not reside in California when the cause of action
accrued). See also infra notes 111-128 and accompanying text (discussing the inapplicability of the
parties physical presence in California when the cause of action accrued in the determination of
whether section 351 tolls the statute of limitations).
111. See, e.g., Kohan v. Cohan, 204 Cal. App. 3d 915, 921, 251 Cal. Rptr. 570, 574 (1988);
State Medical Education Bd. v. Roberson 6 Cal. App. 3d 493, 501, 36 Cal. Rptr. 258, 265 (1970);
Cvecich v. Giardino, 37 Cal. App. 2d 394, 397, 99 P.2d 573, 576 (1940); State National Bank v.
Kerfoot, 41 Cal. App. 198,200, 182 P. 320,322 (1919); San Diego Realty Co. v. Hill, 168 Cal. 637,
639, 143 P. 1021, 1023 (1914); McCormick v. Marcy, 165 Cal. 386,388-89, 132 P. 449,453 (1913);
Chappell v. Thompson, 21 Cal. App. 136, 137-38, 131 P. 82, 83-84 (1913); McKee v. Dodd, 152
Cal. 637, 639-40, 93 P. 854, 856 (1908); Dougall v. Schulenberg 101 Cal. 154, 157, 35 P. 635, 638
(1894). See generally Halper, supra note 35, at 619 (discussing the history of the California courts'
use of section 351 in situations where a defendant was absent from California when the cause of
action accrued).
112. Kohan, 204 Cal. App. 3d at 921,251 Cal. Rptr. at 574. See Cvecich v. Giardino 37 Cal.
App. 2d 394, 399, 99 P.2d 573, 575-76 (1940) (holding that if the cause of action arose out of the
state, section 351 tolls the statute of limitations from running until the defendant comes within the
state's jurisdiction).
113. 204 Cal. App. 3d 915, 251 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1988).
114. ld. at 920, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 573.
115. Id at 918, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 571-72.
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dissatisfied with the third brother's accounting of the business
assets, filed suit against the third brother in California for
declaratory and injunctive relief, dissolution of partnership,
accounting, breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty.
1 16
The defendant brother argued that the applicable four year statute
of limitations barred plaintiffs' action, because the cause of action
accrued in 1976, when the defendant withdrew from the
partnership.117 The plaintiffs countered by asserting that section
351 tolled the statute of limitations until the parties moved to
California in 1979.118 In response to this claim, the defendant
argued that section 351 was inapplicable to the pending action
because section 351 uses the words "return to the State," and
therefore, has no application to a nonresident defendant who was
never in California." 9 In addition, the defendant argued that
section 351 should apply only where a defendant's absence from
California deprives the plaintiff of a meaningful opportunity to sue
the defendant, or where the cause of action sued upon has a nexus
with California sufficient to justify providing a California
forum.120
In its holding, the Kohan court relied on a prior California
appellate court decision121 determining that the term "return to
116. Il at 918,251 Cal. Rptr. at 572. In 1981, the plaintiffs requested and received a statement
of assets in the defendant's possession. Id. It was this accounting that the plaintiffs found
unsatisfactory. Id.
117. 1&. at 919,251 Cal. Rptr. at 572. In support of his claim, the defendant offered copies of
letters he sent to each of the plaintiffs in 1976 which clearly stated his intention to withdraw from
the partnership. I&a See CAL. CPr. P'oc. CODE § 337(1) (West Supp. 1992) (defining the statute of
limitations for actions based upon rescission of a written contract as four years).
118. Kohan, 204 Cal. App. 3d at 919, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 572.
119. Id at 920,251 Cal. Rptr. at 573. The defendant added that a party cannot "return" to a
state he or she never entered in the first place. Id.
120. Id. at 922, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 575. The defendant asserted that when cause of action
accrued, the plaintiffs, as well as defendant, resided in Iran, so the defendant's absence from
California in no way impeded plaintiffs" ability to bring suit. I&a In addition, the defendant argued
that because neither party resided in California at the time the cause of action accrued, the plaintiffs*
claim had no legal nexus with the state sufficient to cause California to provide a forum for
resolution of the dispute. Id
121. See Cvecich v. Giardino, 37 Cal. App. 2d 394, 398-99, 99 P.2d 573, 575 (1940)
(explaining that the plain meaning of the term "return" in section 351 implies coming back after
having first been in California). However, the term as used in statutes of limitations, and particularly
in tolling provisions such as section 351, has been interpreted by courts to toll the statute not only
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the State," as used in section 351, cannot be construed as limiting
the application of the tolling provision to defendants that once were
residents of California." Because the application of section 351
was not limited to residents and past residents of California, the
Kohan court held that the plaintiffs' cause of action was tolled
while the defendant was out of the state, despite the fact that at the
time the cause of action accrued, all of the parties were residing in
Iran and only subsequently moved to California.'23 In addressing
the defendant's second argument, the court pointed out that there
is no language in section 351, or in the cases interpreting that
section, which limits its applicability to situations where a plaintiff
is deprived of an opportunity to sue due a to defendant's absence,
or where the cause of action has a nexus with California.
24
The Kohan decision expanded the application of section
351."z However, courts dealing with the application of section
351 have also limited its scope in other areas.126 The narrowed
where the defendant was once a resident of the state and leaves it, but also where the defendant has
never been in California until the filing of the complaint. Id at 399, 99 P.2d at 575.
122. Kohan, 204 Cal. App. 3d at 920-21, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 573-74. But see McCormick v.
Blanchard, 7 Or. 232, 237 (1879) (holding that an Oregon statute tolling the statute of limitations
until the defendant returns to the state is not applicable in actions where the parties were never
physically present in the state prior to the filing of the claim); Snoddy v. Cage 5 Tex. 106, 111-12
(1849) (holding that a tolling provision, similar to section 351, could not be applied to toll the
running of a statute of limitations in actions where the defendant was not physically present in Texas
when the cause of action accrued and had never been in Texas prior to that time).
123. Kohan, 204 Cal. App. 3d at 921, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 574.
124. Id at 923, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 575. The court held that defendant's argument to limit the
scope of section 351 was misguided because a broad application of the tolling provision served an
important state purpose. Id The court relied on the finding in Dew v. Appleberry, 23 Cal. 3d at 630,
636, 591 P.2d 509, 513, 153 Cal. Rptr. 219, 223 (1979), that the legislature may have justifiably
concluded that section 351 still served an important purpose in California law despite the introduction
of extraterritorial service of process. Id. See supra note 69-87 and accompanying text (discussing
court's reasoning in Dew).
125. See Kohan, 204 Cal. App. 3d at 921, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 573. The holding expanded the
class of defendants to which section 351 may be applied to include defendants who have never been
physically present in California. Id
126. See Abramson v. Brownstein, 897 F.2d 389, 393 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding section 351
unconstitutional in situations involving interstate commerce); Cardoso v. American Medical Sys., Inc.,
183 Cal. App. 3d 994, 998-99, 228 Cal. Rptr. 627, 629-30 (1986) (stating that the section 351 tolling
statute does not apply to causes of action involving foreign corporations); Epstein v. Frank, 125 Cal.
App. 3d 111, 120, 177 Cal. Rptr. 831, 835 (1981) (holding section 351 inapplicable to limited
partnerships when the sole general partner is absent from the state); Bigelow v. Smik, 6 Cal. App.
3d 10, 15, 85 Cal. Rptr. 613, 616 (1970) (holding that the tolling statute does not apply to
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scope of application is evident in various courts' refusal to apply
section 351 to certain classes of defendants, such as nonresident
motorists. 7 As discussed below, courts have also refused to
apply section 351 to corporate defendants.
12 8
B. Section 351 Applied to Both Foreign and Resident Corporate
Defendants
California courts treat foreign corporate defendants in much the
same manner as they treat nonresident motorists1 29 because, like
nonresident motorists, statutory regulation of foreign corporations
provide that a foreign corporation must have an agent in the state
to receive process. 30 Due to this statutory scheme, courts have
found that section 351 is inapplicable to foreign corporate
defendants.' The California Fourth District Court of Appeal
analyzed the issue of whether section 351 was applicable to foreign
corporations in Loope v. Greyhound.'32
In Loope, the court analyzed the statutory scheme providing
service of process on foreign corporations, noting that service of
process can be made on a designated agent of the corporation, or
on the Secretary of State if no agent exists, and judgment can be
nonresident motorists).
127. See supra notes 97-108 and accompanying text (discussing section 351 as applied to
nonresident motorists).
128. See infra notes 129-136 and accompanying text (discussing the California courts refusal
to apply section 351 to corporate defendants).
129. See supra notes 97-108 and accompanying text (discussing section 351 as applied to
nonresident motorists).
130. See CAL CoRp. CODE §§ 2105, 2110, 2111 (West 1978 & Supp. 1992) (providing
statutory scheme for service of process on foreign corporations). See infra note 133 (providing the
language of CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2105, 2110, 2111).
131. See Cardoso v. American Medical Systems, Inc., 183 Cal. App. 3d 994, 998, 228 Cal.
Rptr. 627, 628-29 (1986) (holding that a one year limitations period applicable to consumer's action
for personal injury is not tolled under section 351 where manufacturer was a foreign corporation
amenable to substitute service of process); Rios v. Torvald Klavness, 2 Cal. App. 3d 1077, 1080, 83
CaL Rptr. 150, 152 (1969) (holding that section 351 is inapplicable where plaintiffs have effective
means of obtaining personal jurisdiction over corporation by substituted service); Loope v. Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 114 Cal. App. 2d 611, 614, 250 P.2d 651, 652 (1952) (holding that section 351 is
inapplicable to foreign corporations who are subject to alternative service of process in California).
132. 114 Cal. App. 2d 611, 250 P.2d 651 (1952).
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rendered against the absent foreign corporation. 33 Therefore, the
court in Loope determined that the statutory provisions provide
amenability to suit rendering section 351 inapplicable to foreign
corporations."3 The court also noted that section 351 was
inapplicable to resident corporations, because resident corporations
cannot depart from or be absent from the state of their
residency. 135 The result of the Loope holding was to eliminate
both resident and foreign corporations from the scope of
application of section 351.136
Subsequently, in Epstein v. Frank,3 ' a California appellate
court applied the same reasoning found in Loope, that a corporate
entity's amenability to service and judgment while not within the
state renders section 351 inapplicable, to conclude that limited
partnerships are also not subject to the section 351 tolling
provision.1 38  The Epstein court contended that a limited
partnership is similar to a corporation in that it is permanently
within the state regardless of the location of its principals.
39
Therefore, the court in Epstein reasoned that the statute of
limitations on claims against a limited partnership is not tolled by
section 351 when the general partner is absent from the state. 4'
As a result of Epstein, limited partnerships, like corporations
and nonresident motorists, are not subject to the tolling provision
133. Id at 614,250 P.2d at 653. See CAL. CoRP. CODE § 2105 (West Supp. 1992) (providing
that in order for a foreign corporation to transact business in California, it is required to obtain a
certificate of qualification from the Secretary of State). Section 2105(a) further provides that in order
to obtain a certification of qualification, a corporation must designate an agent within the state upon
whom process directed to the corporation may be served. Id See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2110 (West
Supp. 1992) (providing that service of process may be made upon a foreign corporation by hand
delivery of a copy of the process to an officer of the corporation or to any person or corporation
designated by the foreign corporation as its agent in the state pursuant to section 2105(a)). See CAL.
CoRp. CODE § 2111 (West Supp. 1992) (providing that if service of process cannot be completed
pursuant to section 2110, and plaintiff proves this to the satisfaction of the court, service may be
made by personal delivery to the Secretary of State or to an assistant or deputy secretary of state).
134. Loope, 114 Cal. App. 2d at 614, 250 P.2d at 652.
135. Id
136. See id at 614, 250 P.2d at 652 (holding that section 351 is inapplicable to both foreign
and resident corporations).
137. 125 Cal. App. 3d 111, 177 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1981).
138. Id at 120, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
139. Id at 120-121, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 835-36.
140. Id at 120, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
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in section 351 because they are amenable to service of process
even if they are absent from the state.141 However, individual
defendants, despite being amenable to service of process when they
cannot be found within the state, are not excluded from the scope
of section 351.142 The application of section 351 to individual
defendants is, however, precluded in the context of interstate
commerce. 
143
C. Section 351 Applied to Interstate Commerce
The commerce clause grants Congress the power to regulate
commerce between the individual States.'" If Congress has not
used that power to legislate on a subject, the commerce clause is
said to be dormant on that subject. 45 Even though the commerce
clause appears to be merely a grant of power to Congress, the
United States Supreme Court has held that the dormant commerce
clause restrains the states from imposing an undue burden on
interstate commerce.
46
Under general commerce clause analysis, where the burden of
a state regulation falls on interstate commerce, restricting its flow
in a manner not applicable to local business and trade, there may
be a discrimination that renders the regulation unconstitutional
141. See id. at 120, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 835 (holding that section 351 is inapplicable to limited
partnerships when the general partner is absent from the state).
142. See infra notes 186-214 and accompanying text (discussing the inequity inherent in
differing applications of section 351).
143. See Abramson v. Brownstein, 897 F.2d at 389,393 (1989) (holding that section 351 is an
unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce). See infra notes 171-179 and accompanying text
(discussing the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal's holding that section 351 is an impermissible burden
on interstate commerce in Abramson v. Brownstein).
144. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
145. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1894). The United States Supreme Court
first gave recognition to the dormant commerce power in the language '[the commerce power] can
never be exercised by the people themselves, but must be placed in the hands of agents, or lie
dormant." Id. See generally Breker-Cooper, The Commerce Clause: The Case for Judicial Non-
Intervention, 69 OR. L RE v. 895, 895-96 (1990) (discussing the dormant commerce clause doctrine).
146. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579
(1986) (holding that a state regulation that imposes an undue burden on interstate commerce is an
unconstitutional violation of the commerce clause).
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per se. 47  If the burden does not rise to the level of
discrimination, a court may balance the state's putative interests
against the interstate restraints to determine if the burden imposed
outweighs any state interests served by the regulation.148 If a
court finds either a discrimination against interstate commerce, or
finds that the burden on interstate commerce outweighs the state's
interest in the regulationi the regulation will be found
unconstitutional.149  Recently, in Bendix Autolite Corp. v.
Midwesco Enterprises,' the Supreme Court analyzed the burden
placed on interstate commerce by a statute that tolled a statute of
limitations during the period in which a defendant was not within
the state. 151
1. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises
In Bendix, the defendant, an Illinois corporation, entered into a
contract for delivery and installation of a boiler system at the
plaintiff's Ohio facility. 15  The plaintiff was a Delaware
corporation with its principle place of business in Ohio. 5 3 A
dispute arose over the contract and the plaintiff filed a diversity
action in federal court in the Northern District of Ohio in
147. See id. at 576 (noting that the focus of a dormant commerce clause analysis is on the
extraterritorial effects of the statute at issue). See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
408-413 (2d ed. 1988). Professor Tribe describes discrimination in terms of a commerce clause
analysis as being regulations which unjustifiably benefit local commerce at the expense of out-of-state
commerce. Id. at 453-454.
148. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 891 (1988). Justice
Kennedy, relying on a proposition set forth in Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State
Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 578-79 (1986), noted that the Ohio statute before the Court might have
been held to be an impermissible discrimination without more. IM. However, the Court in Bendix
chose to assess the interests of the state to demonstrate that the statute's legitimate sphere of
regulation does not significantly advance the state interest while interstate commerce is subject to
substantial restraints. Id
149. Bendix 486 U.S. 888, at 891.
150. 486 U.S. 888 (1988).
151. See id at 893 (holding that a statute that tolls a statute of limitations for any period that
a person or corporation is not "present" in the state violates the commerce clause). Under the statute,
to be present in the state, a foreign corporation must appoint an agent for service of process, which
operates as consent to the general jurisdiction of the Ohio courts. Id. at 892.
152. Id. at 889.
153. Id. at 890.
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1980.4 The defendant immediately asserted an Ohio statute of
limitations as a defense.155 However, the plaintiff responded by
claiming that the limitations period had not elapsed, because under
an Ohio tolling provision, 156 a statute of limitations is tolled for
claims against corporations that are not present in Ohio and have
not designated an agent for service of process. 57
The Supreme Court held that the Ohio tolling statute violated
the commerce clause.'58 The Court reasoned that by forcing a
defendant to obtain a resident agent for service of process in
Ohio159 and become subject to general jurisdiction of Ohio courts,
the statute compelled foreign corporations to make a choice
between exposure to the general jurisdiction of Ohio courts, or
relinquishment of the use of the statute of limitations as a defense
causing the corporation to be subject to suit in Ohio in
perpetuity.' 6 The Bendix Court found this created a situation in
which the Ohio statutory scheme imposed a greater burden on out-
of-state companies than it did on Ohio companies, subjecting the
154. Xd
155. Id See Omio REv. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 1302.98(a) (Anderson Supp. 1992) (providing that
an action for breach of a sales contract must be commenced within four years from the date the cause
of action accrued).
156. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. tit. 23, § 2305.15(a) (Anderson Supp. 1987) The statute
provides that:
[w]hcn a cause of action accrues against a person, if he is out of the state... the period
of limitation for the commencement of the action ... does not begin to run until he
comes into the state .... After the cause of action accrues if he departs from the state
... the time of his absence... shall not be computed as any part of a period within
which the action must be brought.
Id
157. Bendix, 486 U.S. at 890. The district court dismissed the action, finding that the Ohio
tolling statute constituted an impermissible burden on interstate commerce in violation of the
commerce clause. Id at 888.
158. Id at 894. The Court noted that in situations where a state denies the statute of limitations
defense to out-of-state persons or corporations engaged in interstate commerce, such regulation will
be reviewed under the commerce clause to determine whether it constitutes an unconstitutional
infringement upon interstate commerce. Id. at 893.
159. Id at 891-93. The Court determined that to gain the protection of the limitations period,
the defendant would have had to appoint a resident agent for service of process in Ohio and subject
itself to the general jurisdiction of the Ohio courts. Id. See OHmo REv. CODE ANN. § 1703.04.1
(Anderson 1985) (providing that every foreign corporation licensed to transact business in the state
must appoint an agent for service of process). Section 1703.04.1 further provides the manner in which
the service shall be made on the agent. Id
160. Bendix, 486 U.S. at 891.
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activities of foreign and domestic corporations to inconsistent
regulations.
1 61
Moreover, the Court in Bendix stated that where a state
regulation affects interstate commerce in such a way as to
discriminate against non-local business, a court may either find
discrimination that renders the regulation invalid without more, or
balance the state's putative interests against the burden on interstate
commerce to determine if that burden is an unreasonable one.162
In choosing to balance the burden on interstate commerce against
the state's interest,163 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority,
noted that the burden on interstate commerce was very significant
because the statute forced a corporation to either subject itself to
the general jurisdiction of the Ohio courts' or face the
possibility of remaining subject to suit indefinitely in Ohio. 65
The Bendix Court reasoned that Ohio's interest in the enactment of
161. Id at 894. The Court determined that because the Ohio statute of limitations was tolled
only for those foreign corporations that did not subject themselves to the general jurisdiction of Ohio
courts, the tolling statute imposed a greater burden on foreign companies than it did on Ohio
companies. Id
162. Id at 891.
163. See id. Justice Kennedy noted that while the Ohio statute might have been found to be a
discrimination that renders the statute unconstitutional per se, in order to show that the legislature's
legitimate scope of regulation is not greatly advanced by the statute while interstate commerce is
substantially burdened, the Court chose to assess the state's interests. Id. See also Pike v. Bruce
Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (providing that where a statute regulates in a non-discriminatory
manner to achieve a legitimate public interest, and its impact on interstate commerce is only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce clearly outweighs the
public benefits it was designed to achieve). But see Bendix, 486 U.S. at 896-97 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (arguing that weighing the governmental interests of a State against the needs of interstate
commerce is a task that should be handled by the legislature, not the judiciary); Breker-Cooper, The
Commerce Clause: The Case for Judicial Non-Intervention, 69 OR. L. REV. 895, 911 (1990)
(proposing that the Court should no longer hear cases involving the dormant commerce clause
because unless Congress acts, the states are free to regulate commerce in any way they choose).
164. Bendix, 486 U.S. at 892-93. The Court noted that the burden of being subject to a state's
general jurisdiction would be significant because such jurisdiction would extend to any suit against
the defendant, regardless of whether the transaction in question had any connection with Ohio. Id
However, Justice Scalia noted that the majority's labeling of a defendant corporation being subject
to general jurisdiction as a significant burden on commerce may be questionable. Id. at 895-96
(Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia asserted that there was no evidence before the Court that would
indicate whether such a burden would be significant or negligible. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
165. Id at 892. On the other hand, Justice Scalia noted that it was hard to assess the
significance of the burden. Id. at 896 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia further noted that the
majority seemed to be under the impression that anything that is theoretically perpetual is a
significant burden. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
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the tolling provision was relatively weak because the state could
execute service of process through the use of a long arm
statute"6  on foreign corporations and entities outside the
state. 67 Balancing the state's interest against the burden on the
plaintiff, the Court in Bendix concluded that the burden on
interstate commerce outweighed Ohio's interest in the statute,
thereby violating the commerce clause.6 8 This same balancing
test was used by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Abramson
v. Brownstein"6  to determine whether section 351 was an
impermissible burden on interstate commerce.'70
2. Abramson v. Brownstein
In Abramson, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed
whether section 351 was an impermissible burden on interstate
commerce.17 The plaintiff, a California resident, agreed to
purchase gold coins and currency from the defendant, a
Massachusetts resident.'72  Plaintiff paid $56,600, but the
defendant never delivered the goods as provided by the
contract.17 The district court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint
on the grounds that the statute of limitations had run on his cause
of action. 74 On appeal, the plaintiff argued that section 351
166. See OHio REV. CoDE ANN. § 2307.38.2 (Anderson 1981) (setting forth the Ohio long arm
statute).
167. Bendix, 486 U.S. at 894. But see G.D. Searle Co. v. Cohn, 455 U.S. 404 (1982) (holding
that for Equal Protection purposes, a state rationally may make adjustments for the fact it is more
difficult to serve a nonresident corporation by curtailing limitations protection for absent foreign
corporations).
168. Bendix, 486 U.S. at 895.
169. 897 F.2d 389 (1990).
170. See id. at 393 (holding that section 351 was an impermissible burden on interstate
commerce). See also infia notes 171-179 and accompanying text (discussing the holding in
Abramson).
171. Abramson, 897 F.2d at 390.
172. Id. at 390-91.
173. Id.
174. Id at 391. Plaintiff admitted in the pleadings that all of the relevant California limitations
periods had expired at the commencement of his lawsuit. Id at 391 n.1.
1667
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 23
tolled the statute of limitations and thus the district court's
dismissal was in error. 75
The Ninth Circuit held in Abramson that section 351 violated
the commerce clause of the United States Constitution. 176 The
court reasoned that the statute was an impermissible burden on
interstate commerce because section 351 required a person engaged
in interstate commerce to be in California for the appropriate
limitations period in order to avoid the application of section
351."7 The court recognized that section 351 forced nonresident
individuals engaged in interstate commerce to choose between
being present in California for the time prescribed by the
appropriate statute of limitations, or remain subject to suit in
California in perpetuity.
178
The Abramson decision resulted in confusion regarding whether
the court was declaring section 351 unconstitutional per se and
therefore totally invalid, or whether the court was making a more
narrow holding that section 351 was only unconstitutional when
applied in situations involving interstate commerce. The confusion
stemmed from apparently contradictory statements made by the
court in separate portions of the opinion.179 This confusion was
175. Id at 391.
176. Id at 393. The court relied on the determination in Bendix v. Midwesco, 486 U.S. 888,
893 (1988), that in situations where a state denies ordinary legal defenses to out-of-state persons or
corporations engaged in commerce, the state law will be reviewed under the commerce clause to
determine whether the denial is discriminatory on its face, or an impermissible burden on commerce.
Id at 392.
177. Id The court noted that defendant was engaged in interstate commerce and because of his
status as a nonresident, he was barred from using the statute of limitations as a defense. Id
178. Id In balancing the burden imposed on interstate commerce against the state's interest
in the statute, the court noted that the state's interest as articulated in Dew v. Appleberry, 23 Cal.
3d 630, 636, 591 P.2d 509, 513, 153 Cal. Rptr. 219, 223 (1979), was to alleviate any hardship that
would result by compelling plaintiff to pursue defendant out of state. Id The court determined
however, that this interest was relatively weak because of alternative methods of service of process
available to the plaintiff, and that the state's interest in no way supported the corresponding burden
on interstate commerce created by section 351. Id
179. See id at 392. The court determined that on its face, section 351 is non-discriminatory
because it treats alike residents and nonresidents of California. Id However, later in the opinion, the
court expressly holds that section 351 is unconstitutional, which would imply that the tolling
provision is unconstitutional per so. Id at 393.
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clarified in the subsequent California Court of Appeals case,
Mounts v. Uyeda.180
3. Mounts v. Uyeda
Mounts involved a personal injury claim between two residents
of California, in which the plaintiff asserted the section 351 tolling
provision to prevent her claim from being barred by the one year
statute of limitations."' The court in Mounts upheld the use of
section 351, finding that the application of the tolling provision in
the case at bar was not an unconstitutional infringement on
interstate commerce because the commerce clause was not
implicated by the facts of the case. 82
In reconciling this holding with the finding in Abramson that
section 351 was unconstitutional, the Mounts court noted that the
facts of the case at bar indicated no interaction between section 351
and the commerce clause, and therefore section 351 could be
applied without violating the commerce clause. 83 Since section
351 can be applied in a variety of situations that do not involve
interstate commerce, the court interpreted the Abramson holding to
mean section 351 was only unconstitutional as applied to interstate
180. 227 Cal. App. 3d 111,277 Cal. Rptr. 730 (1991).
181. Id at 114, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 732. The defendant, a California resident, pointed a gun in
a threatening manner at the plaintiff, also a California resident, while driving on the freeway. Id Four
days after the applicable one year statute of limitations had run, the plaintiff filed a claim against
defendant for inflicting severe emotional distress as a result of the incident. Id The plaintiff asserted
that the statute of limitations was tolled during the defendant's four day absence from California and
therefore the plaintiff's action was not barred by the statute of limitations. Id
182. Id at 122,277 Cal. Rptr. at 737-38. The court's finding in Mounts, that the use of section
351 did not impinge on interstate commerce, necessarily implied that the Mounts court read
Abramson to hold that section 351 was unconstitutional as applied to interstate commerce, rather than
unconstitutional per se. Id at 122,277 Cal. Rptr. at 737. See also supra note 179 and accompanying
text (discussing the lack of clarity in the Abramson opinion as to whether section 351 was
unconstitutional per se, or simply unconstitutional as applied to interstate commerce).
183. Mounts, 227 Cal. App. 3d at 123,277 Cal. Rptr. at 737-38. In reconciling Abramson with
the holding in Mounts, the court emphasized that in Mounts both parties were local residents, and the
alleged injury did not involve interstate commerce. Id
1669
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 23
conmerce. 18 Accordingly, both the Abramson and Mounts
decisions seemingly remove parties involved in interstate commerce
from the legitimate scope of section 351. The narrowed scope of
application of section 351, evidenced by Abramson and Mounts,
and the lack of necessity for section 351,15 have brought more
focus on the inequities inherent in the continued use of section 351,
and have led to the questioning of the section's continued vitality.
III. INEQUITIES INHERENT IN SECTION 351 AND
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The purpose behind the enactment of section 351 no longer
exists in California, and the continued application of section 351 is
repugnant to the policies underlying the statute of limitations
defense. 86 The basic policy behind any statute of limitations is
that the defendant's right to be free of stale claims takes
precedence over the plaintiff's right to prosecute the claim.187 In
order to ensure fairness in the application of any statute of
limitations, if a prospective plaintiff is under a disability, the statute
of limitations will be tolled.188
184. Id at 122,277 Cal. Rptr. at 737-38. See In re Marriage of Siller 187 Cal. App. 3d 36,48-
49, 231 Cal. Rptr. 757, 764-65 (1986). The Siller Court determined that a statute is not facially
unconstitutional simply because it may not be constitutionally applied to some persons or
circumstances. Icl Unless it is in conflict with the constitution, any overbreadth may be remedied in
a case by case analysis. Id. See also Thornhilv. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,101-106 (1940) (holding that
a statute is invalid on its face and wholly void only when incapable of any valid application); County
of Sonoma v. State Energy Resources Conservation 40 Cal. 3d 361,368, 708 P.2d 693, 698, 220 Cal.
Rptr. 114, 119 (1985) (noting that to determine a statute's constitutionality, the court must uphold
it unless it is in clear and unquestionable conflict with state or federal constitutions); Pacific Legal
Foundation v. Brown 29 Cal. 3d 168, 180-81, 624 P.2d 1215, 1221, 624 Cal. Rptr. 487,493 (1981)
(stating that a challenge to a statute's constitutionality must demonstrate that its provisions inevitably
pose a present total and fatal conflict with applicable constitutional prohibitions).
185. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text (discussing the decreased necessity of
section 351 following the development of long-arn statutes and altemative service of process).
186. See supra notes 43-56 and accompanying text (discussing how developments in alternative
service of process and long arm statutes have eliminated the underlying purpose of section 351).
187. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text (defining a statute of limitations and
describing a statute of limitations policy basis of promoting justice by preventing surprises through
the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have
faded, and witnesses have disappeared).
188. See supra note 25-28 and accompanying text (discussing disabilities as they relate to the
tolling of a statute of limitations).
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In 1892 when section 351 was enacted, the California
Legislature considered a plaintiff to be under a disability if the
defendant was absent from the state because such an absence made
it almost impossible for a plaintiff to instigate a claim against that
defendant.1 9 The tolling provision of section 351 is no longer
necessary to serve this interest because the interest has been
eliminated by subsequent legislation. 90 Long arm statutes and
substituted service of process now allow a plaintiff, who in the past
would have been under a disability because of a defendant's
absence from California, to pursue a defendant out of the state and
make him or her subject to in personam jurisdiction in California
courts.
19 1
California courts have held that because nonresident
motorists, 192  corporations 193  and limited partnerships1 94  are
amenable to alternative forms of service of process, they are
excepted from the provisions of section 351. Yet these courts found
the same rationale did not apply to individual defendants, even
though individuals are subject to the same substitute form of
service of process. 95 A question arises as to why amenability to
189. See supra notes 28-56 and accompanying text (discussing the policy considerations
underlying section 351).
190. See CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE §§ 415.20-415.50 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992) (providing
alternative methods of service of process in California); id. § 410.10 (West 1973) (setting forth the
California long ann statute which provides for the exercise of "jurisdiction on any basis not
inconsistent with the state or federal constitution"). See also supra notes 41-56 and accompanying
text (discussing the effect the California long arm statute and alternative methods of service of
process have on a state court's jurisdictional scope).
191. See supra notes 41-56,75-77 and accompanying text (discussing the effect the California
long arm statute and alternative methods of service of process have on a resident plaintiff's ability
to pursue a cause of action against a out-of-state defendant).
192. See Bigelow v. Smik, 6 Cal. App. 3d 10, 15, 85 Cal. Rptr. 613, 616 (1970) (holding
section 351 does not apply to nonresident motorists). See supra notes 97-108 and accompanying text
(discussing the holding in Bigelow).
193. See Cardoso v. American Medical Systems Inc., 183 Cal. App. 3d 994,998-99,228 Cal.
Rptr. 627, 629 (1986) (holding that section 351 does not apply to foreign corporations). See supra
notes 129-136 and accompanying text (discussing the holding in Cardoso).
194. See Epstein v. Frank, 125 Cal. App. 3d 111, 120, 177 Cal. Rptr. 831, 835 (1981) (holding
section 351 inapplicable to limited partnerships when the sole general partner is absent from the
state). See supra notes 137-141 and accompanying text (discussing the holding in Epstein).
195. See supra notes 69-87 and accompanying text (discussing section 351 as it applies to
individual defendants with a focus on the relevancy of a defendant's amenability to service of
process).
1671
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol 23
service of process renders section 351 inapplicable in cases
involving nonresident motorists, foreign corporations and limited
partnerships, while the same amenability to service of process has
no effect on the application of section 351 in cases involving
individual defendants.
The argument offered by the court in Dew v. Appleberry was
that the legislature may justifiably have concluded that a
defendant's physical absence impedes his availability for suit, and
that it would be unfair to force a resident plaintiff to pursue the
defendant out of state in order to commence an action before the
statute of limitations runs. 96 It would seem that a resident
plaintiff's inconvenience is not, by itself, enough to justify a
provision that, in effect, enables a party to stall in filing a claim,
which is in direct conflict with the policy behind a statute of
limitations. If the inconvenience rose to the level of a disability,
then such a statute could be justified.197 However, because of the
availability of alternative service of process and long arm statutes,
no disability occurs when defendant leaves the state. Therefore,
section 351 cannot be justified as a protecting resident plaintiffs
against disabilities.
Despite the lack of need for section 351, some courts have
expanded the tolling provision's application to encompass claims
that have no legal nexus with California. 98 As held in Kohan v.
Cohan, section 351 can be utilized to toll a statute of limitations
even if, at the time the cause of action accrued, the parties were
residing outside the state and subsequently moved into the
state. 99 This creates situations where a cause of action, which
196. Dew v. Appleberry, 23 Cal. 3d 630, 636,591 P.2d 509, 514, 153 Cal. Rptr. 219, 223-24
(1979) (holding that in situations involving a non-corporate defendant, defendant's amenability to
service of process was irrelevant to the application of the section 351 tolling provision). See supra
notes 69-87 and accompanying text (discussing the holding in Dew).
197. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text (discussing disabilities as they relate to the
tolling of a statute of limitations).
198. Kohan v. Cohan, 204 Cal. App. 3d 915,921,251 Cal. Rptr. 570,574 (1988) (holding that
section 351 applies where both parties did not reside in California when the cause of action accrued).
See also supra note 111-128 and accompanying text (discussing the holding in Kohan).
199. See Kohan, 204 Cal. App. 3d at 921,251 Cal. Rptr. at 574. See supra notes 111-128 and
accompanying text (discussing the holding in Kohan).
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has no legal nexus with California, other than the parties being
residents of the state, may be brought in California an indefinite
amount of time after it accrued. In addition, the Kohan decision
exposes a defendant who is currently a resident of California, to
virtually unending liability on claims that arose in foreign
jurisdiction by not running the statute of limitations until that
defendant moves to California." 0
California attempted to solve this problem through legislation
which prohibits a plaintiff from bringing a claim in California
which would be barred by the statute of limitations in the state
where the cause of action arose." 1 This statute is not completely
effective however, because it would have no effect at all if the state
in which the cause of action arose also tolls the statute of
limitations in the defendant's absence.2" One possible solution
to the problems created by the Kohan decision would be to
expressly limit the application of section 351 to causes of action
that accrue in California, or causes of action involving at least one
California resident.2 3
Additionally, the narrowed scope of section 351 indicates that
both the legislature and the courts are slowly recognizing that
section 351 burdens out-of-state defendants, and creates great
opportunity for misuse by delinquent plaintiffs, without serving a
legitimate purpose. The Abramson decision's most significant
impact on section 351 is that it drastically limits the scope of the
200. See Halper, supra note 35, at 621 (noting that a person who moves to California may be
subject to liability for stale claims that arose during his or her residence in a foreign jurisdiction due
to the tolling of the statute of limitation by section 351).
201. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 361 (West 1982). The statute provides:
When a cause of action has arisen in another state, or in a foreign country, and by the
laws thereof an action thereon cannot there be maintained against a person by reason
of the lapse of time, an action thereon shall not be maintained against him in this state,
except in favor of one who has been a citizen of this state, and who has held the cause
of action from the time it accrued.
Id
202. See Halper, supra note 35, at 620-21 (noting that section 361 would be of no practical
effect if the state whose statute of limitations is borrowed tolls the statute of limitations during the
defendant's absence).
203. See id at 621 (arguing that the legislature should consider the enactment of express
limitations on section 351 in order to avoid the unsatisfactory result extending section 351 to cases
that have no legal nexus with California).
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tolling provision."°4  Prior to the Ninth Circuit in Abramson
finding section 351 unconstitutional as applied to interstate
commerce,2°5 section 351 had already been significantly limited
in its application to foreign corporations, nonresident motorists, and
limited partnerships. 20 6 Currently, the only class of defendants
that section 351 still applies to is individual resident defendants and
nonresident defendants, not including nonresident motorists,
involved in claims arising from transactions other than those
involving interstate commerce.0 7
Section 351 tends to be applied most frequently in cases where
both the plaintiff and the defendant are residents of California." 8
With resident defendants, the most typical application of section
351 is where the defendant temporarily leaves the state with the
intent to return. In these cases, it is hard to see the need for the
tolling provision in section 351 because such individuals are
already amenable to service of process if not personally, then
through delivery to a family member, registered mail or
publication."M This creates a situation where the defendant is
penalized for taking a legitimate vacation out of state, often times
204. See Abramson v. Brownstein, 897 F.2d 389, 393 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding section 351
unconstitutional in situations involving interstate commerce). See supra notes 171-179 and
accompanying text (discussing the Abramson courts decision to eliminate application of section 351
in cases involving interstate commerce).
205. See Abramson, 897 F.2d at 393 (holding that section 351 is unconstitutional as applied
to interstate commerce). See also supra notes 180-185 and accompanying text (discussing the
Abramson holding and the Mounts interpretation of Abramson which limited the Abrarason holding
to applications of section 351 involving interstate commerce).
206. See supra notes 97-108, 129-136, 171-179 and accompanying text (discussing the
narrowed scope of section 351).
207. See supra notes 97-108, 129-136, 171-179 and accompanying text (discussing the
narrowed scope of section 351).
208. See, e.g., Mounts v. Uyeda, 227 Cal. App. 3d 111, 277 Cal. Rptr. 730 (1991); O'Laskey
v. Sortino, 224 Cal. App. 3d 241,273 Cal. Rptr. 674 (1990); Kohan v. Cohan, 204 Cal. App. 3d 915,
251 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1988); Dew v. Appleberry, 23 Cal. 3d 630, 591 P.2d 509, 153 Cal. Rptr. 219
(1979).
209. See CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE §§ 415.20-415.50 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992) (providing
alternative methods of service of process in California); id. § 410.10 (West Supp. 1992) (setting forth
the California long arm statute which provides for the exercise of "jurisdiction on any basis not
inconsistent with the state or federal constitution"). See supra notes 43-56, 69-87 and accompanying
text (discussing the availability of alternative methods of service of process and state courts extended
jurisdiction).
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long before the statute of limitations has run.210 Such an absence
rewards a tardy plaintiff who has failed to file an action within the
statutory period."'
The problems inherent in the application of section 351 must
be addressed with affirmative steps by the legislature, as the courts
have declared themselves unwilling to make the changes
needed.212 One possible solution to the problems created by the
application of section 351 would be to repeal the section entirely.
This would allow the legislature a clean slate on which to
formulate a more narrowly tailored statute to respond to any
problems that may be created by the absence of such a tolling
provision. One legitimate interest that may be left unprotected
without section 351 would be situations in which the defendant
goes into hiding or somehow disappears, and is no longer amenable
to service of process. This interest could be better protected by a
statute that tolls the statute of limitations when a defendant is not
amenable to service of process.
Another solution would be to amend section 351 to read that no
person shall be considered to be out of the state when that person
is subject to the jurisdiction of the California courts. Other states,
including Illinois, have implemented this statutory approach.2" 3
Such an amendment would allow section 351 to protectplaintiffs
210. See, e.g., Mounts, 227 Cal. App. 3d at 114, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 732 (tolling the statute of
limitations for a four day period in which the defendant had travelled outside of California);
O'Laskey, 224 Cal. App. 3d at 245-46, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 676 (tolling the statute of limitations for
a two week period in which the defendant was vacationing in Las Vegas); Dew, 23 Cal. 3d at 633,
591 P.2d at 510-11, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 221 (tolling the statute of limitations for a five week period
in which the defendant was in Ohio visiting his parents).
211. See O'Laskey, 224 Cal. App. 3d at 244, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 675. In O'Laskey the plaintiff
hired a private investigator to find out whether the defendant had been absent from the state during
the period the statute of limitations was running. Il Upon finding that the defendant had been absent
from the state on a two-week vacation to Las Vegas, the plaintiff attempted to use the tolling
provision in section 351. 1a&
212. See Dew, 23 Cal. App. 3d at 637, 591 P.2d at 514, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 223-24. The court
stated that if it is advisable that the statute be changed to accommodate more modem concepts of
service of process, the legislature has the power to effect such changes, but it is not the role of the
court to do so. Id.
213. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, pam. 13-208(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991) (providing that
no person is considered to be out of the state when he or she is subject to the jurisdiction of the
courts of Illinois).
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from defendants who conceal themselves or somehow disappear to
avoid being sued. This purpose is not already covered by state long
arm jurisdiction and alternative service of process, so section 351
would no longer overlap these provisions.214
CONCLUSION
Section 351 of the California Code of Civil Procedure was
enacted over one hundred years ago, and since that time, changes
in the law and society have rendered it an unnecessary, if not
unjust, statute. The primary purpose behind the enactment of
section 351 has long since been eliminated by changes in
jurisdictional doctrine,21 5 and any legitimate purpose left would
be better served by a more narrowly tailored statute. Moreover,
plaintiffs utilizing the tolling provision are often times not doing so
because they were unable to serve process on the defendant during
the prescribed statutory period, but instead because the plaintiff's
themselves were negligent in not complying with the applicable
statute of limitations.21" The continued use of section 351 unduly
burdens defendants who travel outside of California during the
running of a statute of limitations, while not serving a legitimate
purpose. This fact alone should encourage the California
Legislature to take action to correct the abuse of Section 351.
Gregory J. Livingston
214. CAL CV. PROC. CODE §§ 415.20-415.50 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992) (providing
alternative methods of service ofprocess in California); ia § 410.10 (West Supp. 1992) (setting forth
the California long arm statute which provides for the exercise of "jurisdiction on any basis not
inconsistent with the state or federal constitution"). See supra note 43-56 and accompanying text
(discussing the availability of alternative methods of service of process and state courts extended
jurisdiction).
215. See supra notes 43-56, 69-87 and accompanying text (discussing the changes in the law
of personal jurisdiction and the effect these changes had on statutes that toll a statute of limitations
during a defendant's absence from the state).
216. See supra notes 186-211 and accompanying text (discussing the abuse to which section
351 is subjected by negligent plaintiffs).
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